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The Risks and Rewards of Criminal 
Activity: A Comprehensive Test 
of Criminal Deterrence 
W. Kip Viscusi, University of Chicago (Visiting), 
Northwestern University, and NBER 
Whereas previous analyses of criminal deterrence have focused on 
the effect of criminal enforcement on crime rates, this study analyzes 
the existence of compensating differentials for criminal pursuits. By 
analyzing the risk-rewards trade-off, this approach represents a 
more comprehensive test of the criminal deterrence hypothesis. The 
sample consisted of black inner-city youths who reported their 
crime participation, crime income, and self-assessed risks from 
crime. The risk premiums for the three principal adverse outcomes 
(arrest, conviction, and prison) constituted between one-half and 
two-thirds of all crime income on the average, providing strong 
support for the criminal deterrence hypothesis. 
I. Introduction 
The economic approach to crime closely parallels the analysis of 
hazardous jobs. In the case of job safety, it is the probability of an injury 
and its severity that constitutes the unattractive feature of the job. For 
This paper is part of a larger esearch project on criminal behavior supported 
in part by a U.S. Department of Labor contract with NBER. Donald Watson 
provided capable research assistance. Helpful comments were provided at various 
stages of the research by Richard Freeman, Harry Holzer, Philip Cook, and 
Gregory M. Duncan. 
[Journal of Labor Economics, 1986, vol. 4, no. 3, pt. 1] 
? 1986 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
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criminal pursuits, the probability is that of apprehension and conviction, 
while the loss is that imposed by the individual's incarceration. The 
parallels are most direct for risk-neutral individuals who view the adverse 
outcomes in terms of monetary equivalents; in each case there is some 
expected loss from the risky undertaking. For individuals to be willing 
to incur these risks, there must be some other offsetting advantage, such 
as a compensating wage premium for risk or a comparatively high 
financial return from crime.' 
Notwithstanding the similarities in the conceptual structure of the 
individual's decision problem, there has been very little relation between 
the empirical tests of the two theories. Whereas the analysis of the risks 
from legitimate opportunities has focused on compensating differentials 
for risk, the crime literature has dealt with the effect of variations in 
criminal enforcement on the degree of criminal activity. The research 
that has been undertaken in this vein provides evidence in support of 
criminal deterrence that is relatively strong and diverse, as Freeman 
(1983) indicates in his recent overview of the crime literature. 
The existence of a variety of studies in support of criminal deterrence 
does not, however, imply that the criminal deterrence findings are not 
controversial. Many of the results have been questioned, for reasons that 
stem largely from the nature of the aggregative data used in past studies. 
There have been four principal criticisms.2 First, measurement error 
regarding the number of crimes generates a spurious correlation between 
the crime rate dependent variable and criminal enforcement variables, 
such as the total arrests per crime. Second, criminal enforcement levels 
and crime rates may be simultaneous, leading to a complicated identifi- 
cation problem since there is no solid conceptual basis for excluding 
predetermined variables. Third, the clearance rate variables (e.g., arrests 
per crime or prison admissions per crime) do not reflect homogeneous 
crime activities, and the mix of crimes is affected by criminal enforcement 
efforts. Finally, some of the time series crime rate equations have not 
been stable and yield results that are sensitive to the particular func- 
tional form. 
In addition to these criticisms that have appeared in the literature 
there is an additional potential problem since past studies have focused 
primarily on the relation between crime and criminal enforcement. 
Ideally, one should also take into account the financial rewards from 
'The principal initial formulation fthis economic model of criminal behavior 
was by Becker (1974). For a review of the sizable conceptual literature on crime, 
see Heineke (1978). 
2 With the exception of the observations on the clearance rate, which appear 
in Cook (1980), all four empirical problems are reviewed by Taylor (1978). Also 
see Ehrlich (1973) for an influential empirical analysis and Witte (1980) for a 
recent study. 
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crime since these payoffs affect both the crime rate and the level of 
enforcement chosen by the community. The primary matter of concern 
to the potential criminal is not the crime risk per se but whether the 
frontier of criminal rewards-crime risks offers a crime option that is 
superior to his legitimate job alternatives. 
The statistical tests presented in this paper consequently have a twofold 
purpose. First, by focusing on the relation between crime income and 
crime risks for individual criminal behavior, I avoid the types of 
shortcomings a sociated with investigations of aggregative crime statistics. 
Second, obtaining direct estimates of the dollar premiums for crime risks 
provides an alternative and more comprehensive type of test for the 
effectiveness of criminal deterrence measures. If this analysis yields 
similar results, one's confidence in the earlier research findings hould 
be bolstered. 
Section II provides an overview of the research approach and a 
description of the NBER minority outh sample that was used for this 
study. This survey includes detailed information on self-reported crime 
income and criminal enforcement risks, making it possible to make the 
direct linkage required for a risk premium analysis. In Section III, I 
analyze the respondents' perceptions of various risks of criminal activity 
and the relation of these risks to overall income levels for crimes of 
different types. Section IV presents the compensating differential estimates 
for both monthly and yearly criminal behavior. As predicted, especially 
hazardous forms of criminal endeavor command compensating differ- 
entials not unlike those for risky legitimate pursuits. 
II. Research Approach and Description of the Sample 
A. Conceptual Framework 
The relation between the compensating differential research and 
analyses of criminal behavior can best be illustrated by considering their 
similar conceptual foundations. Although there is not a demand for 
crime per se, individuals do create an implicit demand for crime through 
their actions. A decision to purchase a more expensive car raises the 
potential rewards to a car thief, but the installation of a burglar alarm 
or an ignition cutoff device reduces the probability of incurring a crime- 
related loss. 
Such individual consumption decisions, including those related to self- 
protection, generate a set of criminal opportunities. The protective 
individual actions in conjunction with criminal enforcement efforts lead 
to a risk p associated with the potential crime income, where for 
simplicity one might view this risk as the chance of apprehension and 
conviction. In practice, there are multiple risks, such as arrest without 
conviction, arrest with conviction, prison terms of differing length, and 
320 Viscusi 
different probation conditions. The risk-rewards frontier of such oppor- 
tunities i all that is relevant since, for crimes with an identical riskiness, 
the more lucrative ventures will dominate those with a lower payoff. 
Two such frontiers are Y1(p) and Y2(p), shown in figure 1. These 
curves have been drawn as being upward sloping for two reasons. First, 
the potential for greater potential losses from crime will increase the 
desire to diminish these through various kinds of protective actions, 
which in turn will increase the risk p.3 For similar reasons, police 
protection in more affluent areas should be greater to the extent that 
this is the collective mechanism for reflecting the greater demand for 
self-protection. Second, if there are any dips or flat spots in the frontier, 
they will not be relevant to individual choice since, as will be shown 
below, criminals will choose to be on only upward-sloping portions 
of Y(p). 
Indifference urves for three representative individuals are also sketched 
in figure 1. These curves are upward sloping since individuals will 
necessarily demand a compensating differential for increases in the risk 
of crime so long as apprehension and conviction is less attractive than a 
successful criminal endeavor. 
The nature of the choice problem is reflected in the following simple 
model. Let there be two states, state 1, in which the individual is 
successful with the crime, and state 2, in which he is not. The utility of 
income x is given by U1(x) and U2(x), respectively, where 
Ul(X) > U2(X); Ux, U2 > ?; Uxx U2x < ?. 
For any given income level, the individual would prefer to be 
successful at crime because of the unattractiveness of being incarcerated. 
Even if criminal success did not affect one's income level, individuals 
would desire a compensating differential for crime risks. 
These effects are bolstered when one takes into account the financial 
loss. Criminal success leads to a crime income Y(p) plus outside 
legitimate income W, whereas failure leads to income Z, where 
W + Y(p)> Z. 
The choice problem for the potential criminal is to select his optimal 
crime risk level or to 
max V = (1 - p)U1[Y(p) + W] + pU2(Z), 
Such statements a sume a relatively homogeneous class of crimes and self- 
protection relations. Some goods may be valuable but can be protected less 
effectively than others. 
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/ / /EY2~(P) 
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Criminal Enforcement Risk p 
FIG. 1.-The market for illegitimate income 
which leads to the requirement 
dY U[ - U2 
dp (1 - p)Ux 
Acceptable crime opportunities will always be on the upward-sloping 
portion of the criminal opportunities curve. Any observed criminal 
behavior arising as a consequence of this market for illegitimate income 
consequently will involve risk premiums.4 In the case of the opportunities 
curve Y2(p), the optimal risk-rewards combination will be A for a person 
with preferences Ua and B for a person with preferences Ub. While these 
indifference urves represent he highest welfare levels attainable from 
available criminal opportunities, for these options to be desirable they 
'This result generalizes to other situations such as time allocation models. 
Appendix A in Viscusi (1979) presents a time allocation model for job risks that 
has many parallels with the model of risky criminal choices. 
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must offer greater ewards than legitimate job alternatives.5 Competition 
among criminals will drive down any rents from criminal activity so 
that there will be no financial incentive for criminals to enter particular 
lines of criminal pursuit when the market for illegitimate income is in 
equilibrium. 
The focus of the compensating crime risk differential nalysis in this 
paper is to estimate the path traced out by points such as A and B.6 The 
observed locus of crime income-risk combinations will have a positive 
slope if there are compensating differentials for crime risks. The test of 
the validity of the criminal deterrence hypothesis consequently is whether 
crime income is positively related to the perceived risk of crime. If there 
is no deterrence effect, points such as A and B should lie along a 
horizontal line. 
The traditional focus in the literature has been quite different. Rather 
than estimate the slopes of such curves directly, the emphasis has been 
on factors influencing crime rates. In particular, what is the probability 
that the individual will choose the no crime corner solution rather than 
a point along the crime income schedule Y1(p) or Y2(p)? As the crime 
opportunities curve shifts upward, more individuals should choose to 
engage in crime because the relative rewards from criminal activity have 
risen. The underlying reasoning is the same as in the compensating 
differential pproach, except that the focus is on discrete choices rather 
than the slope of the frontier. 
The empirical approach in the deterrence literature has been more 
narrow, however, as crime participation is related only to variables 
pertaining to the crime risk, such as arrest rates for crime, thus excluding 
crime income as an explicit concern. This approach will be correct if 
one is analyzing situations in which there are no differences in crime 
income levels. In effect he value along the vertical axis in figure 1 is 
assumed to be constant so that crime participation in the stringent 
enforcement region Y1(p), which imposes a greater risk per unit of crime 
income earned, will be less than in the weaker enforcement situation 
for Y2(p). 
Such equality of crime income levels need not prevail, however. The 
stringent enforcement region may be coupled with extraordinarily high 
criminal rewards, making crime more attractive than in the weak 
enforcement area. Such a pattern is particularly likely to be the case to 
the extent that areas with greater crime income opportunities (e.g., more 
affluent areas) opt for greater levels of police protection. Given the very 
close interrelation between the potential financial gains from crime and 
5 If there are individuals who choose to engage in crimes at very low risks, 
then the economic returns from crime will approach those from a legitimate job 
as the risk becomes increasingly small. 
6 For two early formal treatments ofthe hedonic approach underlying this 
paper, see Rosen (1974) and Thaler and Rosen (1976). 
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both the incentive to commit crime and society's desire to protect such 
losses from occurring through criminal enforcement, it is clearly not 
ideal to examine only variations in crime risk and their relation to 
crime rates. 
To the extent that the economic incentives to commit crime have been 
analyzed in past analyses it has been through the inclusion of variables 
such as the area's poverty rate or the unemployment rate, but these 
measures are directed more at the potential criminal's legitimate oppor- 
tunities than at the income crime might generate. By undertaking an 
analysis that includes both the positive and the negative features of 
criminal behavior, we can obtain results that give us a more comprehensive 
perspective on the factors that influence criminal behavior. 
B. Description of the Sample 
The sample I will use is the NBER Survey of Inner City Black Male 
Employment. This survey, which was undertaken in 1979-80, provides 
detailed information on the characteristics and activities of a sample of 
2,358 inner-city minority ouths from Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia. 
The age span included in the survey was 15-24, which is a high crime 
group that accounts for 60% of all criminal arrests.7 Moreover, black 
youths account for a disproportionate share of these arrests, so that the 
survey addresses a major segment of the overall criminal population. 
In addition to including the usual survey questions on personal 
characteristics and legitimate activities, the NBER survey included 
questions on the individual's criminal activity, his income from crime, 
and the perceived risks from criminal activity. Their self-reported crime 
activity variables will be the focus of the empirical analysis since, in 
terms of the analysis presented earlier, they provide information pertinent 
to both dimensions of the diagram sketched in figure 1. 
Self-reported variables are potentially the most reliable sources of 
information on the individual's assessment of the risks of crime and its 
rewards. Unfortunately, the sensitivity of these questions may lead 
respondents to understate the extent of their criminal involvement. This 
underreporting problem is particularly severe for black sample popula- 
tions, such as the one in the NBER sample.8 As a result, I have estimated 
that the annual crime rate for the sample may be more than twice as 
large as the 19% rate of crime that the respondents reported for the 
past year.9 
7The crime statistics cited in this paragraph pertain to 1981. 
8 For a review of this evidence, see Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis (1981). 
9 In Viscusi (1986), I present several estimates on the extent of the reporting 
bias using the Hindelang et al. (1981) self-reporting bias estimates, data on 
juvenile delinquency, and consistency of the reported crime rates in the sample 
and their rates of past imprisonment. All three approaches yielded bias factor 
estimates in the range of 2-4. 
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Although understatements of criminal behavior may create potential 
problems for the empirical analysis, the study by Hindelang et al. (1981) 
suggests that the underreporting primarily affects the intercepts of the 
regression equations; the coefficients are not distorted provided that the 
regression focuses on within-group behavior. The NBER sample only 
includes information on black youths, so the biases that arise in across- 
group comparisons will not enter. Since the Hindelang et al. study's 
focus on juvenile delinquency closely parallels the emphasis of the 
NBER survey, the findings of that study are closely related to the likely 
characteristics of the NBER sample. 
Table 1 provides a glossary of the variables, and table 2 lists the 
sample means and standard deviations for the full sample, for those who 
committed crime in the past month, and for those who engaged in crime 
during the past year. The personal characteristics variables that play 
such an instrumental role in analyses of legitimate arnings display little 
variation across one's criminal status. Age, education, and marital status 
levels are similar for all three sample groups. Since there is very little 
variation in these variables, the differences that might be evident in a 
survey of a broader population group are not apparent. Participation in 
crime is strongly related to personal characteristics such as whether one 
drinks, takes drugs, or smokes marijuana. Church attendance is negatively 
related to criminal behavior. 
The majority of the sample was either employed or attending school, 
with one-third of all respondents in neither of these categories. For the 
criminal subsamples, the degree of idleness is particularly great, as 
roughly half those who commit crime are not employed or in school. 
The NBER survey included several crime-related background questions. 
During the past 13 months, the time spent on probation (PROBT) or in 
jail (JAILT) was small for the entire sample but much larger for the 
criminal population. Membership in a gang or having friends in a gang 
(GANG) was positively related to criminal involvement, as was the 
perceived existence of a problem of crime in the neighborhood. 
The first of the criminal activity variables is CHANCE, which is the 
number of opportunities to make money illegally that the respondent 
encounters per week. Based on the performance of this variable, which 
is reported in Viscusi (1986), CHANCE serves primarily as a measure 
of the intensity of criminal activity. Those who engaged in crime during 
the past month have an average of 1.4 such illegal earnings opportunities 
weekly, as compared with .71 options for the entire sample. The crime 
participation dummy variables (CRIME-MO and CRIME-YR) will not 
explicitly enter the empirical analysis but will serve as the primary 
variables for stratifying the monthly and yearly crime subsamples. 
The primary focus of the empirical analysis will be on the level of 
crime income during the past month (CRIMEY-MO) and during the 
past year (CRIMEY-YR). Although reported crime income accounts for 
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Table 1 
Glossary of Variables 
AGE = Age in years 
EDUCATION = Years of schooling 
MARRIED = Marital status dummy variable (d.v.); MARRIED = 1 if respondent is 
married, 0 otherwise 
DRINK = Drinking d.v.; DRINK = 1 if respondent ever drinks beer, wine, or 
hard liquor, 0 otherwise 
DRUGS = Drugs d.v.; DRUGS = 1 if respondent ever uses drugs such as 
cocaine, heroin, barbituates, amphetamines, or LSD; 0 otherwise 
POT = Marijuana d.v.; POT = 1 if respondent currently uses marijuana, 0 
otherwise 
RELIGION = Religion d.v.; RELIGION = 1 if respondent attends services at least 
once a month, 0 otherwise 
JOB = Employed d.v.; JOB = 1 if respondent was working most of the last 
week 0 otherwise 
SCHOOL = School d.v.; SCHOOL = 1 if respondent was going to school most of 
the last week, 0 otherwise 
PROBT = Number of months on probation during the time line period 
JAILT = Number of months in jail during the time line period 
GANG = Gang membership d v.; GANG = 1 if respondent was a member of a 
gang or had friends in a fang, 0 otherwise 
CNBD = Crime in neighborhood d.v.; CNBD = 1 if respondent believed that it 
was true that crime and violence in the neighborhood was a serious 
problem, 0 otherwise 
CHANCE = Number of chances respondent has to make money illegally per week 
CRIME-MO = Crime d.v.; CRIME-MO = 1 if respondent committed criminal acts in 
last four weeks, 0 otherwise 
CRIMEY-MO = Crime income in the past month 
CRIME-YR = Crime d.v.; CRIME-YR = 1 if respondent committed criminal acts in 
last year, 0 otherwise 
CRIMEY-YR = Crime income in the past year 
ARREST-HI = Respondent assesses chance of getting arrested as being high; 0-1 d.v. 
for perceived risks 
ARREST-LO = Respondent assesses chance of getting arrested as being low; 0-1 d.v. 
CONVICT-HI = Respondent assesses chance of getting convicted (conditional on 
arrest) as being high; 0-1 d.v. 
CONVICT-LO = Respondent assesses chance of getting convicted (conditional on 
arrest) as being low; 0-1 d.v. 
PRISON-HI = Respondent assesses chance of going to prison (conditional on 
conviction) as being high; 0-1 d.v. 
PRISON-LO = Respondent assesses chance of going to prison (conditional on 
conviction) as being low; 0-1 d.v. 
ARREST = Weighted arrest risk; high = .75, medium = .5, and low = .25 
CONVICT = Weighted convicition risk; high = .75, medium = .5, and low = .25 
PRISON = Weighted prison risk; high = .75, medium = .5, and low = .25 
LOW = Chance of arrest, conviction, and prison are all low; 0-1 d.v. 
RISK = Overall crime risk; ARREST X CONVICT X PRISON 
BOS = Regional d.v.; BOS = 1 if respondent lives in Boston, 0 otherwise 
CHI = Regional d.v.; CHI = 1 if respondent lives in Chicago, 0 otherwise 
PHILA = Regional d.v.; PHILA = 1 if respondent lives in Philadelphia, 0 
otherwise 
under 10% of the sample's total income, for those who commit crime 
illegal income is relatively large-$272 monthly for those who committed 
crime in the past month and $1,504 annually for those who committed 
crime in the past year. To put these amounts in perspective, it is 
Table 2 
Sample Characteristics: Means and Standard Deviations 
Crime in 
Full Last Crime in 
Variable Sample Month Last Year 
Personal characteristics: 
AGE 19.1 19.8 19.6 
(2.6) (2.6) (2.6) 
EDUCATION 10.8 10.8 10.6 
(1.6) (1.4) (1.4) 
MARRIED* .036 .043 .043 
DRINK* .59 .82 .82 
DRUGS* .03 .16 .14 
POT* .36 .71 .68 
RELIGION* .33 .22 .23 
LABOR market status: 
JOB* .26 .24 .25 
SCHOOL* .40 .22 .25 
Crime-related background: 
PROBT .04 1.5 1.4 
(2.0) (3.4) (3.4) 
JAILT .01 .03 .03 
(.84) (1.5) (1.4) 
GANG* .08 .17 .16 
CNBD* .39 .52 .52 
Criminal activity: 
CHANCE .71 1.39 1.36 
(1.15) (1.34) (1.35) 
CRIME-MO (month) ($)* .15 1.0 .97 
CRIMEY-MO 40.28 272.15 213.65 
(439.71) (520.90) (477.91) 
CRIME-YR (year) ($)* .19 .77 1.0 
CRIMEY-YR 279.99 1,688.41 1,503.92 
(1,325.98) (3,689.57) (3,370.69) 
Criminal enforcement: 
ARREST-HI N.A. .058t N.A4 
ARREST-LO N.A. .734t N.A.t 
CONVICT-HI N.A. .074t N.A.t 
CONVICT-LO N.A. .791t N.A.t 
PRISON-HI N.A. .142t N.A.t 
PRISON-LO N.A. .710t N.A4 
ARREST N.A. .332t .463t 
CONVICT N.A. .321t .4274 
PRISON N.A. .358t .470t 
LOW N.A. .583t .4124 
RISK N.A. .052t .188t 
Location: 
BOS* .32 .30 .32 
CHI* .34 .29 .28 
PHILA* .34 .41 .40 
Sample size 2,358 349 439 
NOTE.-Standard deviations are in parentheses. N.A. = not applicable. * Standard deviations of 0-1 dummy variables are omitted since they can be calculated from their 
fraction m in the sample, where the standard deviation is (m - mr2)05. 
t Perceived. 
: Constructed. 
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noteworthy that the average legal income level for the sample was just 
over $2,800. 
The next set of variables pertained to the perceived risks of criminal 
enforcement. This set of questions was only administered to respondents 
who had engaged in criminal activity in the past month. The principal 
questions concerned whether at the time he committed his crimes the 
respondent believed the risk of arrest, the risk of conviction conditional 
on arrest, and the risk of prison conditional on conviction were high, 
medium ("about 50-50"), or low. 
For the monthly criminal subsample, the respondents' answers were 
used to create a series of perceived crime risk variables. The first set of 
variables pertained to whether the respondent believed that the risks of 
arrest (ARREST-LO), conviction (CONVICT-LO), and prison (PRISON- 
LO) were low. In each case, about three-fourths of the sample assessed 
the risks as being low. The high-risk response (ARREST-HI, CONVICT- 
HI, and PRISON-HI) will not be used in the empirical analysis but are 
reported here to provide a broader perspective on the responses. The 
high risks tend to increase somewhat as one moves through the criminal 
justice system, reaching a peak of .14 for the risk of prison conditional 
on conviction. 
The next group of variables represented scaled versions of these 
dummy variables where a medium risk received a value of .5, which is 
tantamount to the "about 50-50" wording of the questionnaire. The 
low-risk response received a value at the midpoint of the lower range, 
.25, while the high-risk responses received a value of .75. All the scaled 
ARREST, CONVICT, and PRISON variables had comparable values 
that ranged from .32 to .36. These three variables were all highly 
interrelated, with simple correlation coefficients around .85. 
Two variables were created to reflect he entire sequence of risks the 
individual faced. The first of these is LOW, which is a dummy variable 
that takes on a value of one only if the respondent believes that the 
risks of arrest, prison, and conviction are all low; that is, it is the product 
of ARREST-LO, CONVICT-LO, and PRISON-LO. Somewhat strik- 
ingly, about three-fifths ofthe sample assessed all these criminal enforce- 
ment risks as being low. The second variable, RISK, is the product of 
ARREST, CONVICT, and PRISON. If one were to treat the scaling of 
the component variables as being meaningful in probabilistic terms, the 
overall risk of being caught and ultimately convicted is about .05. (In 
reality, the risk is much lower since the scaling of low risk as being .25 
overstates these risk levels.) When compared with the component-scaled 
risk variables, RISK is only one-sixth the size of these values, which 
suggests that the succession of risks that one must face before being sent 
to prison gives a criminal a fairly good chance of escaping criminal 
punishment at some juncture. 
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Although comparable perceived risk data were not available for the 
yearly criminal responses, a lengthy computer algorithm utilized the 
monthly data to construct objective risk measures for each individual. 
The crime risk responses were matched to the particular crimes the 
individual committed in the past month, weighted on a proportional 
basis in the case of multiple criminal pursuits. The linkage between the 
monthly and the yearly crime responses was this crime risk X activity 
variable. The risk assigned to the individual's annual criminal activities 
corresponded to the risks associated with the crimes he committed in 
the past year, where in the case of multiple criminal pursuits the crimes 
were weighted proportionally. The constructed risk consequently is the 
overall risk posed by the individual's criminal pursuits. 
Unlike the perceived risks, this variable is not affected by individual 
differences in thresholds regarding what, for example, constitutes a high 
risk. This greater objectivity is a positive feature, and, as a result, both 
objective risk variables and perceived risk variables will be used in 
analyzing the monthly crime data. The perceived risk variables offer the 
offsetting advantage that they may better reflect he risks posed by the 
individual's particular crimes and his manner of committing them. 
Neither variable is clearly preferable on a priori grounds. 
Finally, a series of dummy variables for different locations was created. 
The respondents were roughly evenly distributed across the three survey 
sites. All those interviewed were black inner-city ouths, whose general 
attachment o the legitimate labor market is quite low. 
III. Risks and Rewards of Criminal Activity 
When individuals commit a crime, they incur a sequence of criminal 
enforcement lotteries. Before an individual can be sent to prison, he 
must first be arrested and convicted. Although imprisonment is not the 
only sanction that affects the undesirability of crime (e.g., establishing 
an arrest record may also be unattractive), it is instructive to examine 
the sequence of links in the criminal enforcement system. 
Figure 2 sketches the sequence of lotteries and the average frequencies 
associated with each component lottery. Unless the individual is arrested, 
there is no possibility of an actual loss imposed by criminal enforcement 
measures. About three-fourths of those committing crime view the risk 
of arrest as being low, which is consistent with prevailing views that 
few criminals are ever caught. The conditional risks of conviction closely 
parallel the arrest perceptions. Almost all those who assess the arrest 
risks as being low believe that if they are arrested the chance of 
conviction is low. Those assessing the arrest risk as being medium also 
tend to believe that the risk of conviction is medium. Finally, those 
assessing arrest risks as being high tend to view conviction risks as being 
Chance of Prison 
Chance of _ ~Med .13 
Convictions 
>/ Med .33 A n Med.40 
Chance of /Med .25 
Arrest/ 
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FIG. 2.-Sequence of criminal enforcement linkages 
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low. In the case of medium and high arrest risks, however, a substantial 
portion view the conviction risk as being low, so that there is a large 
potential for escaping punishment in the second stage of the criminal 
justice system. 
The final set of lotteries on imprisonment involves relatively small 
samples, particularly for the upper portion of the chance fork diagram, 
since most respondents went down the initial ow-arrest-risk path. It is 
noteworthy that the prospects for ultimately escaping criminal sanctions 
are quite high since at least one of the three sequential risks is usually 
low. Most respondents who assessed the arrest risk as being high, for 
example, viewed the chance of imprisonment conditional on conviction 
as being low. 
The same general pattern displayed by the arrest and conviction risks 
also holds for risks of imprisonment since there is a strong correlation 
among the various risks. The positive correlation among the various 
risks is not unexpected. These risks are based on the types of crimes the 
individual commits. Gambling, for example, is likely to be a low-risk 
crime compared with armed robbery, irrespective of whether one is 
considering the risk of arrest, the risk of conviction, or the risk of 
prison. The emphases of the different phases of the criminal justice 
system should all reflect society's assessment of the severity of the 
offense. Other factors may also enter, such as the ease of identifying 
crimes that have been committed. "Victimless" crimes such as drug 
dealing are rarely reported, whereas muggings are reasonably well 
reported, so that arrest rates for reported crimes may not always reflect 
the likely consequences facing the individual should he be caught. As a 
broad generalization, however, the positive correlation of the different 
criminal sanction risks appears to be an accurate reflection of the actual 
enforcement process. 
Individual perceptions also enter, particularly in the case of biased 
beliefs. Those who systematically underestimate arrest risks are likely to 
underassess the risks of conviction and imprisonment, thus compounding 
their errors. The constructed risk variables based on average perceived 
risks across crime categories are intended to alleviate this difficulty. 
The extent o which perceived risks vary by crime category isreflected 
in the breakdowns presented in table 3. The respondents indicated which 
of 10 different crimes they committed: numbers and illegal gambling, 
selling and fencing stolen goods, selling marijuana or other drugs, 
burglary and larceny, muggings and purse snatchings, hoplifting or 
theft from cars, cashing or forging stolen checks, con games and frauds, 
robberies and holdups, and other illegal activities. The average number 
of crime categories in which criminals participated was 1.6. In the case 
of multiple criminal pursuits the risks associated with the crimes were 
weighted proportionally. 
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There is considerable disparity in the crime risks associated with the 
different types of crime. Shoplifting is a relatively safe crime, as few of 
the respondents believed that the risk of arrest or conviction was high, 
and the overall RISK level is at its lowest value. This crimes does tend 
to pose more medium risks than do other categories so that the overall 
value of the LOW variable is not as great as for some other categories. 
The most frequently committed crime category, numbers and illegal 
gambling, also is quite safe both in terms of the scaled RISK variable 
and in terms of the degree to which all the three sequential crime risks 
assume a low value (i.e., LOW). This pattern accords with the actual 
risks from gambling since this activity is seldom reported to police. 
At the high end of the criminal risk spectrum are predatory crimes 
such as burglary. The prison linkage conditional on conviction is 
especially strong, as the risks rise steadily as one moves through the 
criminal justice system. 
Chief among the crimes posing an intermediate risk is drug dealing, 
which is the second most prevalent crime category. Unlike crimes such 
as con games and burglary, the risk of suffering punishment for selling 
drugs does not escalate as one passes through the successive steps toward 
conviction. Many respondents believe that the chance of arrest for this 
crime is quite low, which is what one would expect since there is little 
incentive for the purchasers of drugs to report the sellers to the police. 
Table 4 summarizes the fraction of the criminal subsamples who 
commit each particular group of crimes and the average income associated 
with each crime class.'0 The two principal sources of reported crime 
income are gambling and drug dealing. This ranking parallels the 
assessments by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, which estimates that 
90% of all illegal income comes from drug dealing and various forms of 
illegal gambling." 
Although numbers and illegal gambling are the most prevalent crimes, 
as two-thirds of all criminals engage in such pursuits, the average crime 
income yielded by this activity is near the middle of the crime income 
spectrum. Numbers and gambling are quite attractive, however, since 
the risk associated with these crimes is not great. 
Drug dealing is also quite widespread, with one-third of the sample 
engaging in such efforts. The rewards from selling drugs are among the 
highest for all crime categories. Another chief source of illegal income 
is fencing stolen goods, which is the third most prevalent criminal 
pursuit and one of the most financially rewarding. 
10 In the case of multiple crime categories, the income was divided proportionally 
among the crime categories. 
11 This estimate was prepared by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service for the 
U.S. Department of Treasury, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget (see U.S. Internal Revenue Service 1980). 
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Table 4 
Crime Participation and Income Level by Crime Category 
Monthly Criminal Behavior Yearly Criminal Behavior 
Fraction Who Average Fraction Who Average 
Category Commit Crime Income ($) Commit Crime Income ($) 
Numbers .668 103.01 .631 565.14 
Fenced .166 191.78 .185 720.85 
Drug dealer .324 189.42 .371 994.54 
Burglary .054 134.56 .114 760.78 
Mugging .023 94.61 .132 744.36 
Shoplifting .089 149.03 .034 373.17 
Forgery .020 120.95 .068 891.48 
Con games .160 133.84 .030 337.67 
Robbery .043 242.78 .159 624.39 
Other crimes .046 443.51 .066 1,928.98 
By far the most lucrative crime category is the residual "any other 
illegal activities" grouping, which captures not only the illegal effort 
categories that were not listed but also the crimes committed by 
individuals who were reluctant to reveal the nature of their crimes. Since 
the average crime income in the other crime activity group is double 
that of the second highest category, this group includes many of the 
most financially successful criminals. The risks associated with the other 
crime category are not particularly large (see table 3), so that the level 
of rewards does not appear to represent a compensating differential per 
se. These overall relations do not, however, take into account the 
intensity of the criminal activity or other variables that influence the 
risk-rewards trade-off. 
IV. Estimates of Compensating Differentials 
The structure of the equations used to estimate the relation between 
crime income and the associated risks was dictated in part by the nature 
of the survey. Respondents who did not engage in crime in the past 
month or the past year were not included in the estimation since these 
individuals were not asked the crime risk questions; nor was there any 
crime activity information that could be used to construct such a risk 
measure. 
For the criminal group subsamples it was possible to construct a series 
of crime risk variables. As discussed above, those who engaged in crime 
during the past month gave self-assessed crime risk responses that were 
used to construct eight perceived crime risk variables. For the four 
perceived crime risk variables that represented continuous crime risk 
levels (i.e., ARREST, CONVICT, PRISON, and RISK) rather than 0-1 
dummy variables, I constructed risk variables for specific crimes that 
were then matched to the self-reported crimes to obtain a constructed 
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risk measure for both the monthly and the yearly criminal subsamples. 
In all, there were twelve crime risk variables for the monthy subsample 
and four crime risk variables for the yearly subsample. 
The failure to obtain crime risk assessments from noncriminal groups 
is not ideal since it would be instructive to analyze how risk perceptions 
alter crime participation decisions. Even with such information we 
would still lack an observable nonzero crime income level for those who 
do not commit crime. All that we know is that the crime income level 
they perceived to be available was below the level they required to 
engage in crime. The observed crime income trade-off will consequently 
understate the premium per unit risk required by those who do not 
engage in crime." The analysis below consequently addresses only the 
observed rates of trade-off one can reap through actual criminal behavior, 
that is, the economic structure of current criminal opportunities, which 
is what is pertinent to estimation of the crime income-risk trade-off 
schedule in figure 1. The estimates pertain to the rates of trade-off 
between crime income and crime risk for those who commit crime, 
which will be different from the trade-offs of noncriminals. 
Each crime income equation included a group of human capital 
variables (AGE, EDUCATION, and MARRIED) that were not statisti- 
cally significant and a set of personal attributes and regional variables 
(DRINK, DRUGS, POT, RELIGION, PROBT, JAILT, JOB, SCHOOL, 
CHANCE, GANG, CNBD, CHI, and BOS). The relation of these 
variables to criminal behavior follows the expected patterns and is 
explored in detail in Viscusi (1986). As a result, I will focus here on the 
crime risk coefficients, where in each case a single crime risk variable 
entered the equation. 
From a conceptual standpoint, all three risk types should influence 
criminal behavior. To the extent that imprisonment is a pertinent 
negative payoff of crime, all three criminal enforcement risks must turn 
out unfavorably for this event to occur. Conviction without imprisonment 
also will impose a loss on the criminal, as may an arrest without 
conviction to the extent that it affects one's police record. Similarly, 
other enforcement-related outcomes such as probation will influence the 
desirability of criminal behavior. Exploratory regressions including two 
or more crime measures did not yield crime risk coefficients that were 
significant on an individual basis. Because of the strong interrelation 
among the probabilistic beliefs concerning the risk assessments, it was 
not feasible to estimate reliably more than a single crime risk variable 
12 A comparable self-selection problem arises in the job risk literature, as noted 
in Thaler and Rosen's (1976) study of high-risk jobs. In Viscusi (1983) I estimate 
the degree of heterogeneity in risk preference. Because the regressions are 
necessarily conditional on crime participation because of the nature of the survey, 
inclusion of a selectivity variable for whether one engages in crime is inappropriate. 
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in each equation. Similar difficulties often arise with respect to compen- 
sating differentials for job risks as most analyses focus on either nonfatal 
or fatal risks because of the difficulties encountered when both risk 
variables appear in the equation. The crime risk coefficients discussed 
below consequently are each based on otherwise identical equations that 
differ only in terms of the risk variable that was included. 
Table 5 summarizes the estimates for the crime risk variables and the 
associated risk premiums implied by the coefficients. The standard 
deviations for these risk premiums in the final column were computed 
from estimates of the risk premiums for each individual in the sample. 
This statistic consequently is intended to reflect the range in risk 
premiums induced by the differences in risk levels across the sample 
Table 5 
Criminal Enforcement Risk Regression Results 
Coefficients* Risk Premiums ($)t 
Perceived risks (monthly): 
ARREST-LO -.526 30.25 
(.146) (527.00) 
CONVICT-LO -.446 20.58 
(.162) (524.02) 
PRISON-LO -.574 34.74 
(.151) (533.82) 
LOW -.564 49.40 
(.136) (531.69) 
ARREST 1.584 107.59 
(.450) (523.88) 
CONVICT 1.046 75.58 
(.446) (522.53) 
PRISON 1.211 92.02 
(.377) (528.29) 
RISK 2.535 30.05 
(.850) (525.39) 
Constructed risks (monthly): 
ARREST 2.228 157.67 
(.378) (532.60) 
CONVICT 2.698 169.57 
(.475) (530.61) 
PRISON 3.060 192.74 
(.504) (529.43) 
RISK .981 23.95 
(.300) (531.94) 
Constructed risks (yearly): 
ARREST 1.663 757.38 
(.313) (3,430.63) 
CONVICT 1.973 812.42 
(.389) (3,422.63) 
PRISON 1.980 874.09 
(.422) (3,416.95) 
RISK .637 31.37 
(.175) (3,424.37) 
* Standard errors are in parentheses. 
t Standard eviations are in parentheses. 
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rather than the precision of the crime risk coefficient estimates, which 
is reflected inthe coefficients (standard errors) column. 
For both the monthly and the yearly crime income equations there is 
consistently strong evidence of premiums for the risks of criminal 
activity. In the case of monthly criminal behavior, the scaled perceived 
risk variables (i.e., ARREST, CONVICT, PRISON, and RISK) as a 
group perform much better than the dummy variables. The effects 
reflected inthe low-risk dummy variables are roughly one-third of those 
implied by their scaled risk counterparts, which better eflect differences 
in the degree of risk. 
The scaled risk variable that does not perform particularly strongly is
the RISK variable, which has a comparatively small effect. These patterns 
in the RISK effects throughout the empirical results uggest hat it may 
not be the entire sequence of risks leading to imprisonment that is of 
paramount concern since the odds of experiencing this adverse outcome 
are not great. Rather the entire set of intermediate outcomes (arrest, 
conviction, probation, etc.) may be instrumental. 
The monthly crime income estimates obtained using constructed risk 
measures suggest much larger isk premiums than did the perceived risk 
findings. Although the perceived risk variable may better capture the 
person-specific r sks, the constructed risk may serve as a better objective 
measure of the crime risk insofar as individual differences in what 
constitutes a high or a low risk do not enter. For the three principal 
scaled risk variables, the average risk premium implied by the perceived 
risk variables is $92 or 34% of monthly crime income, whereas the 
monthly risk premium implied by the constructed risks is $173 or 64% 
of all crime income. In each case there is clear-cut evidence of risk 
premiums, implying that the crime income-risk profile is upward 
sloping. 
The yearly crime income results also lend support to the criminal 
deterrence hypothesis. The spirit of the results is very similar to the 
monthly findings, with crime risk premiums averaging $815 or 54% of 
total crime income. The crime risk share is somewhat less for the yearly 
crime income since the respondents who committed crimes in the past 
month engage in criminal activity on a more intensive basis. Both in 
terms of the levels of crime income per unit time and the number of 
crimes committed, those who engaged in criminal activity during the 
past month have stronger criminal inclinations than those who only 
committed crimes at some point in the past year. The risks posed by 
committing any particular crime category consequently may be a bit 
larger to the extent hat the CHANCE and other variables do not fully 
reflect he greater intensity of criminal activity of the monthly crime 
participants. 
The constructed crime risk results imply crime risk premiums on the 
order of 54%-64% of all crime income. These results represent much 
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stronger effects han do the risk premiums for the health and safety risks 
of jobs, which average 6%./13 The dominant role played by crime risk 
premiums i not inconsistent with the strong empirical results concerning 
the effect of criminal enforcement onparticipation i crime. In addition, 
criminal activity requires a much lower commitment oftime than a full- 
time job so that the risk premium will be a larger component of the 
income. The annual crime risk premium is of roughly the same order of 
magnitude asjob risk compensation, which averages $900 for blue-collar 
workers. 
Nevertheless, there is widespread belief that the risks of being appre- 
hended and sent to prison are low, and, if sent to prison, this outcome 
is much less severe than being killed on the job. If the risks of crime 
were smaller than those posed by hazardous jobs, risky criminal pursuits 
would clearly dominate risky jobs as a potential income source. Using 
information from the Washington, D.C., area for the crime categories 
most similar to those analyzed here, I estimate that each crime committed 
has a probability of .087 of leading to arrest and an unconditional 
probability of.014 of being convicted and serving time in jail.14 Although 
these estimates exclude crimes such as numbers, which are seldom 
reported, they are at least suggestive of the kinds of risks associated with 
property crimes. In contrast, he average risk of a reported nonfatal job 
injury is about 1/30 per year, and the average risk of a fatality is about 
1/10,000 annually. The risk of prison appears to lie between these two 
risks in terms of both its severity and the probability involved. 
The crime risk premium levels consequently are not inconsistent with 
available evidence regarding how individuals make decisions among 
other risky opportunities toearn income. In each case, activities posing 
additional risk will command compensating differentials. Legitimate and 
illegitimate activities both have upward-sloping income-risk profiles. 
The primary distinguishing characteristic ofillegitimate activities i that 
the risk premiums have an additional policy implication in that they 
imply that enhanced criminal enforcement will raise the risks to crime, 
thus diminishing its attractiveness. 
V. Conclusion 
When compared with other risky income-generating pursuits, crime 
is clearly one of the most hazardous income sources. Most workers 
facing occupational health and safety risks received risk premiums that 
13 This estimate, which is based on the findings in Viscusi (1979), is comparable 
to the results in other risk premium studies. Also see Smith (1976, 1979). 
14 The crime categories I used were reporting rate (burglary, larceny, and auto 
theft), conditional arrest rate (robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft), and 
conditional rates of serving time in jail (robbery, burglary, larceny, auto theft, 
narcotics, and others). Differences in data availability and reliability generated 
differences in the crime categories used. 
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are under 10% of their earned income. In constrast, he risk premiums 
for criminal activities constitute between one-half and two-thirds of all 
crime income. 
Although the risks posed by the criminal enforcement system are 
notoriously low, the absolute magnitude of the probability of impris- 
onment for most crimes committed by the sample is over 100 times as 
large as the risk of death faced by the typical blue-collar worker and 
about one-half of the average risk of a nonfatal job injury. The nonrisk 
compensation for criminal behavior is not great since, for many crimes 
such as muggings and car theft, the forgone leisure time is not a major 
component of the criminal activity. A person's decision to engage in 
such crimes will be governed largely by the risk the crime poses and the 
financial returns itoffers. Consequently, there is an important qualitative 
difference b tween legitimate and illegitimate income-generating activities 
in terms of both the level of the risk and the nature of the time 
allocation. 
The empirical evidence on the premiums for criminal risks is strong 
and quite robust. The results presented here indicate that there is a 
positive relation between crime income levels and crime risks. This 
relation was quite stable for both monthly and yearly crime activity 
data. Changes in the specification of the risk variable (perceived vs. 
constructed risks) and in the particular isk measure (ARREST, CON- 
VICT, and PRISON) did not greatly alter either the significance ofthe 
link or the magnitude of the implied risk premium. 
The positive risk-rewards linkage provides an alternative test in 
support of the criminal deterrence hypothesis. Unlike most studies in 
the literature, it avoids the intrinsic problem associated with using 
aggregative data on crime rates and criminal enforcement levels. The 
NBER sample also offers the additional advantage of making possible a 
joint analysis of the risks and rewards of crime, thus providing a more 
comprehensive test of criminal deterrence. The results bolster the findings 
of other studies supporting the empirical importance of criminal de- 
terrence. 
In terms of the conceptual foundations of the crime decision, there 
should be little reason to disagree that risky crimes hould command 
wage premiums or that crime should be responsive to criminal sanctions. 
Much of the controversy over deterrence issues presumably has arisen 
because of the magnitude of the effects and their implications for criminal 
justice policy. The inherent shortcomings ofthe data typically used have 
created sufficient ambiguities to foster a prolonged debate over the 
empirical effect of criminal enforcement measures. The findings here 
suggest hat the threat of criminal sanctions does not simply pass the 
usual tests of statistical significance but is a dominant determinant of
crime income. 
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The strength ofthese results does not imply that economic opportunities 
do not influence the criminal behavior of this sample. In a companion 
paper (see Viscusi 1986) I found that legitimate job prospects also 
affected criminal behavior. Whether crime-related policies should focus 
on increased criminal enforcement orimproved economic opportunities 
depends not only on the extent of these policies' present influence on 
criminal behavior but also on the cost of manipulating these policy 
variables. A decision to tilt the policy mix in favor of more stringent 
criminal enforcement hinges largely on the marginal productivity of 
such expenditures. How much, for example, will an increase in the 
police budget alter the risk of apprehension, thus deterring additional 
crimes? Although my data do not enable me to make any judgments on 
the enforcement cost-crime risk linkage, the subsequent relation between 
criminal behavior and criminal enforcement risks is very powerful. 
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